# Edge exposure and authentication -- cloud specifics > The model, the identity plane and on-prem behaviour: > [EDGE-AUTH.md](/v/2.2.1/dfe-infra/EDGE-AUTH.md). This page covers what changes when the > Gateway Service is internet-facing: the public listener, the render guard, > CIDR allow-listing, rate limiting, WAF and DNS. ## Internet-facing defaults On a cloud deploy the Gateway Service is internet-facing: `envoyGateway.service.internetFacing` is true in `edge-aws.yaml`, `edge-gcp.yaml` and `edge-azure.yaml`, because each cloud makes a LoadBalancer public unless told otherwise. **Public web access is default-deny, per exposure group.** A route's class puts it in a group: dfe-ui, HyperDX and the engine's browser families are `console`; the engine's CLI families, `/openapi.json` and SCIM are `api`; the admin UIs are `admin`. Every route of a group, on its internal name and its public one, is refused at Envoy unless the client address is on `exposure.groups..allow`, and the group's `deny` list is refused first. | `exposure.groups..allow` | The group's routes | Said by | |---|---|---| | empty | 403 to every address outside `exposure.selfRanges` | NOTES, `dfe-ops access-summary` | | ranges | the ranges, and `exposure.selfRanges` | NOTES, `dfe-ops access-summary` | | a `/0` of either family | every address | a WARNING in both | Every web route the chart renders carries its own SecurityPolicy with its group's rule; the OIDC ones AND it with their group check. The Gateway-wide policy, `dfe-edge-fence`, refuses every address, so it holds only a route another namespace attaches. Ingest routes (`otel`, and `receiver` on `exposure.groups.ingest.door: gateway`) carry the ingest group's rule the same way. The `:80` redirect carries an explicit allow, since it serves nothing but a 301 to the fenced https side. One Service carries every listener, so the load balancer cannot tell the groups apart: its source ranges are the union of the enabled web groups' allow lists, the ingest group's while an ingest route renders, `exposure.selfRanges` and `envoyGateway.service.loadBalancerSourceRanges`. A group that admits every address leaves it open. The Envoy Service carries the web groups' state as `dfe.hyperi.io/edge-fence: console=,api=,admin=`, and the CIDRs each group's routes admit, with `exposure.selfRanges`, as JSON in `dfe.hyperi.io/edge-fence-ranges`. `exposure.selfRanges` is the cluster's own NAT egress, which the aws root writes onto the cluster secret. It is a fact, never an allow list: the deployer's lists live in the deploy repo's `infra/common.yaml`, where the engine can change them at runtime. `exposure.groups.admin.enabled` defaults off on the same three flavours, and `argocd/values/aws.yaml` sets `oidc.enabled: true` -- Argo CD, Kafbat, Forgejo, the links page and Cruise Control all stay off the public load balancer until an operator's overlay turns the group on. HyperDX is class product, beside the console that frames it, so the switch never reaches it. The chart's render guard (`envoy-gateway-config.validateUi`) refuses the admin group on an internet-facing Service with an empty `exposure.groups.admin.allow`, unless `allowPublic: true`, and refuses `allowPublic` without an edge OIDC provider (`oidc.enabled` and an `oidc.providers` entry). ## Upgrading a cloud deployment - Set `exposure.groups.console.allow` (and `api.allow`, `admin.allow` as needed) in the deploy repo's `infra/common.yaml` before upgrading. An internet-facing Gateway with an empty list answers 403 on that group's routes from the first sync. - `ui.allowed_cidrs`, `exposure.infraUisExternal` and `ui.public.` are retired and refuse to render, each naming its replacement. - The trusted ranges a deployment already runs with live on its Argo CD cluster secret, in `dfe.hyperi.io/edge_trusted_proxy_cidrs`, and stay trusted until `bootstrap.sh` runs again. Only bootstrap writes that annotation, and `dfe-ops refresh` and `dfe-ops upgrade` leave it alone. Re-run bootstrap after upgrading, or remove the annotation, so a load balancer's subnets stop being believed. ## The client address the fence judges The fence judges the TCP peer. No listener believes `X-Forwarded-For` unless `ui.trusted_proxy_cidrs` names the hops in front, so neither a client nor a host beside the load balancer, such as the tunnel forwarder in an AWS public subnet, can claim a listed address. With no client-IP detection, Envoy Gateway v1.9.2 sets `use_remote_address` and trusts no hop (`internal/xds/translator/listener.go`). | Flavour | Load balancer | Envoy's TCP peer | |---|---|---| | AWS | NLB with IP targets and `preserve_client_ip.enabled=true` (`edge-aws.yaml`) | the client | | GCP | GKE's passthrough Network Load Balancer, `externalTrafficPolicy: Local` (Envoy Gateway's default) | the client | | Azure | Azure Load Balancer, `externalTrafficPolicy: Local` | the client | | On-prem | MetalLB or another L4 pool, `externalTrafficPolicy: Local` | the client, or a node address where the pool SNATs | A CDN in front of the public hostnames writes the client into `X-Forwarded-For` and connects from its own ranges. Name those ranges in `ui.trusted_proxy_cidrs` (the dial's `edge.product.trusted_proxy_cidrs`). The public listeners then read the header right to left when the peer is inside the list and take the first address outside it, while every other connection is judged by its own address. The internal listener never reads the header. List only a proxy that writes the header itself: never an L4 load balancer, and never a subnet other hosts share. ## Public hostnames on a cloud deploy Everything DFE uses internally is private. The UIs are the exception, because their users sit outside the VPC, and the gateway chart's `ui:` values expose them. Nothing in it acts until `ui.public_domain` (the dial's `edge.product.domain`, itself the deployment's `dns.public_zone`) names a delegated public zone. The keys below are the CHART's. The dial states the same decisions under `edge.product` and `edge.admin_uis` (`deployment.example.yaml`), where `rate_limit`, `waf` and `tls` are these values verbatim and the rest is the dial's own spelling. `ui.rate_limit.per_client_requests` is the chart's alone. | Key | Default | What it decides | |---|---|---| | `ui.public_domain` | `""` | The public zone the UIs answer on. Empty renders no public half. | | `ui.public.` | `dfe_ui: true`, `hyperdx: false` | Which product UIs get a public hostname. | | `exposure.groups.admin.tools.` | every tool `false` | Which admin UIs get a public hostname, once the admin group is on. | | `exposure.groups..allow`, `.deny` | `[]` (nobody, internet-facing) | Who may reach the group's routes, at Envoy AND, as a union, at the load balancer. | | `ui.trusted_proxy_cidrs` | `""` (no forwarded header believed) | A CDN or other L7 proxy in front of the public hostnames, whose `X-Forwarded-For` names the client. | | `ui.rate_limit` | on, 6000/Minute, `local` | Each public route's shared bucket, the wall a distributed credential-stuffing run meets before the login, per proxy replica. | | `ui.rate_limit.per_client_requests` | 1200 (per `unit`) | A bucket per client address, per route, per proxy replica, on every public route and on every internal-name web route of an internet-facing Service, so one caller's dashboard cannot empty HyperDX for the rest. | | `envoyGateway.connectionLimit` | on, 10000 | Concurrent connections each listener takes per proxy replica. | | `ui.waf.mode` | `none` | Only `none` renders. | | `ui.tls` | `"1.2"`, HSTS on | The public TLS floor and `Strict-Transport-Security`. | A public UI gets its OWN listener, its own publicly trusted certificate and its own HTTPRoute `-public` -- not a second hostname on the internal route, because the policies that make a public route safe must not reach the internal one. Internal routes keep the internal CA; the public hostnames hold a Let's Encrypt certificate issued by DNS-01 on the public zone through cert-manager's Pod Identity role (`tls.public`). ## What fails the render These fail the render rather than shipping a weaker edge: - **A public UI with no authentication.** Edge OIDC (`edgePolicy`, or `oidc.targetRoutes` naming the route, with a provider configured) counts, as do the three app-side schemes above -- dfe-ui's NextAuth, Kafbat's own OIDC, HyperDX's `dfe_token` cookie. Nothing else does. - **The receiver route on an internet-facing Service with no caller auth.** The chart cannot read the receiver's `config.server.auth.mode`, so `routes.receiver.authMode` restates it, and only `header` or `bearer` renders. Envoy terminates TLS, so `mtls` never sees a client certificate. - **`internetFacing: false` on a load balancer the cloud makes public.** The key is declared, not derived, so `false` is refused beside `service.beta.kubernetes.io/aws-load-balancer-scheme: internet-facing`, and on GCP or Azure (`cloud` or `global.cloud`) on a LoadBalancer Service with no `networking.gke.io/load-balancer-type: Internal` or `service.beta.kubernetes.io/azure-load-balancer-internal: "true"`. - **An entry in any group list, `selfRanges` or `trusted_proxy_cidrs` that is not a CIDR range**, such as a bare address. Envoy Gateway and the load balancer would refuse it at admission, failing the whole gateway sync. - **The admin group on an internet-facing Service with no allow list**, unless `allowPublic` is true with an edge OIDC provider. - **A retired key**: `ui.allowed_cidrs`, `exposure.infraUisExternal` or `ui.public.`, each refused with its replacement named. - **A `/0` of either family in `trusted_proxy_cidrs`.** Every peer is then trusted, so Envoy takes the client from the leftmost `X-Forwarded-For` entry, which the caller writes. `render_dial.py`, `bootstrap.sh` and the aws root refuse it too. - **`rate_limit.scope: global`**, which needs a Redis backend named in the EnvoyGateway install config. - **`rate_limit.requests` or `rate_limit.per_client_requests` that is not an unquoted whole number from 1 to 4294967295**, the range Envoy Gateway admits. 0 would refuse every caller, and the old dial's quoted `"300"` is a string. - **`rate_limit.requests` at or below `rate_limit.per_client_requests`.** Envoy spends the lower-rate bucket first, so one caller could empty the shared one for every public user. - **An engine route whose internal path list is empty.** A rule with no matches answers every path on the dfe hostname. - **`waf.mode` other than `none`.** A WAF terminates TLS above Envoy, which moves the public certificate to the cloud's certificate store. - **A `ui.public.` with no route**, rather than the flag doing nothing. On AWS the load-balancer half of the filter is `loadBalancerSourceRanges`, which the AWS Load Balancer Controller turns into the NLB's frontend security group. That group can only be attached at creation, so the controller must own the Service from the start -- see the annotations and their reasons in `argocd/values/edge-aws.yaml`. The ranges fence the WHOLE front door, ingest included: one Service carries every listener. The engine answers on two routes on its one hostname: `dfe-engine` carries the browser families (`routes.dfeEngine.browserFamilies`) for the console group, and `dfe-engine-cli` carries the CLI families, `/openapi.json`, the Swagger pages where the engine serves them and, with `exposure.groups.api.scim`, SCIM, for the api group. The edge OIDC login fronts `dfe-engine` alone, because the CLI cannot follow an interactive redirect; the engine authenticates every call itself.